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As ageing baby boomers increasingly assume responsibility for their own financial futures, demand for 
financial planning and funds management services is set to grow strongly. But are the boomers getting 
value for the fees they pay? And, is the advice they receive tailored or merely generic?  
As the baby boomer generation moves progressively into retirement, the proportion of Australians aged 65 
or over is projected to almost double over the next 30 years. Reflecting the growth in self-funded 
retirement within this cohort, there is likely to be a corresponding increase in the number of people seeking 
financial advice.  
Against this backdrop, this paper examines mainstream agency theory in the context of current financial 
planning practice in Australia. Specifically, the paper examines whether superannuation investors receive 
value for money in terms of fees, and whether the advice they receive is tailored or generic.  
Measures in the 2007 Federal Budget to abolish taxes on the earnings of superannuation funds in the 
drawdown phase prompted strong inflows of contributions. However, the onset of the global financial crisis 
the following year, and the collapse of Storm Financial in 2009, inflicted heavy losses on investors.  
This situation provided added impetus for the 2009 Inquiry into Financial Products and Services in Australia 
(the Ripoll Report), and the 2010 Super System Review Panel (the Cooper Review). In turn, these reviews 
served as inputs into the Future of Financial Advice (FoFA) and MySuper reforms.  
Amid an ongoing debate on issues related to financial planning, this paper identifies six key questions, 
which are addressed below.  
1. Should fee-for-service supplant asset-based fees?  
Extending the theory of fee structures for actively managed funds, there is a view that efficient fees should 
include a fixed component to address the agent’s inherent self-interest. This underlies the rationale for a 
flat-fee structure, analogous to a fee-for-service. However, contracts that also retain asset-based fees 
appear preferable, as they cater more fully to the interests of all parties.  
Another extension of the theory is that the assets an investor places with an active manager should not 
include those whose purpose is to generate an income return to cover essential living expenses. These 
assets should instead be allocated to risk-free investments such as term deposits.  
Consequently, an optimal investment management contract is one that excludes assets which should not 
be exposed to risk. Management services for the remaining assets should then be charged on the basis of a 
flat fee, plus two asset-based components. The first is proportional to fund earnings, and the second is a 
fulcrum-style performance fee that rewards outperformance but penalises underperformance.  
2. Should commissions from product providers to planners be banned?  
 
 
 
 
Predicated on the argument that an agent should not try to serve two principals simultaneously, 
commissions paid to advisers represent an area of contention. This is because of the potential conflict of 
interest between the client and the adviser, who stands to receive a product-related benefit from both the 
client and the product provider.  
The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) has banned ‘conflicted remuneration’ in 
financial plans written since July 2013. Similarly, since this time, the FoFA reforms require financial planners 
to provide advice that is in the best interests of their clients.  
3. Do recommended asset allocations tend to be too risky for clients on the cusp of retirement?  
The Financial Planning Association of Australia (FPA) concurs with the assertion by Russell Investments that 
up to 60 per cent of nominal investment earnings in retirement accrue from post-retirement returns. This 
implies that investors cannot rely exclusively on interest-type income in retirement. Instead, they should 
retain a portfolio exposure to growth assets.  
However, there are three problems with the universal application of this assertion.  
First - it appears to be based on comparisons of nominal, as opposed to real, contributions and investment 
earnings.  
Second - an asset allocation strategy targeted towards delivering an expected level of nominal returns 
cannot be justified solely on the basis of its potential. Other risk-related factors, such as the outlook for 
inflation, should also be taken into account.  
Third - a comfortable retirement usually necessitates drawing down on superannuation balances, rather 
than attempting to maintain them.  
4. Do financial plans tend to be ‘cookie cutter’ ones rather than customised to the particular 
circumstances of clients?  
The FPA evidently takes the view that a high exposure to growth assets is not the sole prerogative of young 
investors.  
In its example statement of advice (SOA), the FPA suggests older investors retain a focus on growth, 
specifically advocating an exposure to growth assets of at least 70 per cent for a couple in the pre-
retirement phase.  
However, there is a counterview to the effect that financial plans are fragile around the point of 
retirement. Specifically, if an investor suffers a major capital loss at this time, it is extremely unlikely that 
the full extent of the loss will ever be recouped. This becomes even less likely if the capital balance is 
further eroded by withdrawals for the payment of essential living expenses. Accordingly, an element of 
flexibility in asset allocation appears warranted in order to manage the vulnerability of a portfolio to capital 
losses at critical moments.  
Flexibility in asset allocation may similarly be warranted to maximise portfolio upside. It stands to reason 
that, as an investor’s years in retirement progress, the present value of their projected essential 
expenditure falls. Therefore, it is plausible that, from a low point at retirement, exposure to growth assets 
could progressively be increased to replenish any capital drawdowns that may periodically occur.  
 
 
 
 
5. Do typical fee structures encourage ‘closet indexing’ by fund managers?  
Theory and practice diverge on the question of the relative merits of active versus passive investment 
management.  
The FPA advocates a considerable degree of active management in its example SOA. This is despite 
international evidence showing that active managers do not match the level of performance expected in 
theoretical models.  
The findings are consistent with the Australian experience, where studies have shown that, despite high 
fees, the level of true active management is comparatively low. Accordingly, it would seem that the 
problem of closet indexing is prevalent among large-cap Australian share funds. Moreover, domestic funds 
generally appear less active than their global counterparts. However, this may be partly explained by the 
concentrated nature of the domestic market, where comparatively few stocks account for an 
overwhelming majority of the market’s total capitalisation.  
6. Has there been inadequate disclosure of dollar (rather than percentage) amounts charged in 
fees?  
The FPA’s example SOA prescribes the disclosure of the dollar amount of fees payable in the first year of a 
contract. However, there is no disclosure requirement for the projected dollar amounts of fees in 
subsequent years. In contrast, the FoFA regime requires the annual disclosure of all dollar amounts payable 
in fees.  
 
